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The question concerning the extent to which the growth performance of an economy is
determined by its external relations is a controversial one. There are several approaches
which stress the interaction between international factors and domestic growth
performance. In the Keynesian tradition, Kaldor and Thirlwall have argued that
exports and trade performance are the main determinants of growth. This paper takes
different elements from these and other theoretical approaches, and combines them into
a framework that stresses the importance of specialization for economic growth. The
paper applies a data set on growth and trade in 11 manufacturing sectors, for the period
1965–1988, for the OECD area. The main novelty in the database is the assignment
of 75 products in the trade data to the 11 industrial sectors. The relationship between
growth and specialization has been tested by running a regression with the sectoral
growth of value added as the dependent variable, and several variables, including some
measuring specialization as well as other factors, as the independent variables. The
regression results presented seem to indicate that specialization does indeed matter for
economic growth. However, this impact seems to be gradually wearing off during the
1980s, as is the case for other factors included in the regression analysis.
1. Introduction
In the field of economic growth theory, a major question concerns the
differences in growth performance between nations. Traditionally, i.e. in the
neoclassical growth model due to Solow (1956), growth was viewed as
determined by a country’s resources. Technological change was seen as
exogenous and equally available to all countries. Thus, in this framework,















































267growth only depends on the availability of labour and capital. In the long run,
all countries converge to an identical steady state, but in the short run, growth
rate differentials may arise due to so-called transitory dynamics.
In recent so-called ‘new’ growth models, e.g. Lucas (1988) and Romer
(1990), the purely resource-based point of view is abandoned in favour of
technological change as an endogenous phenomenon. Although the extent to
which countries invest in technology is still also determined by its resources
(in this case human capital), parameters such as technological opportunities
and efficiency of the R&D process now enter the analysis. Moreover, a very
important role is played in these models by increasing returns to scale due to
Marshallian externalities in the R&D process.
A third perspective on economic growth argues that growth is to an
important extent determined by the external relations of a country. However,
this idea is a controversial one. For example, Krugman (1994) has forcefully
argued that the issue of competitiveness, which underlies the idea that growth
is determined by the performance in international product markets, does not
make sense from a theoretical point of view.
The idea of a relation between trade performance and economic growth is
not identified strictly with one type of literature within the field of economic
growth. Many of the models in the new growth tradition derive a relationship
between trade and growth (e.g. Grossman and Helpman, 1991; Rivera-Batiz
and Romer, 1991). Outside the mainstream, there are also several approaches
which stress the interaction between international factors and domestic
growth performance. In the post-Keynesian tradition, Kaldor (1966, 1970)
and Thirlwall (1979) have argued that exports and trade performance are
the main determinants of growth (see also Boggio, 1996). Their approaches,
which characterize growth as ‘export-led’, or as ‘balance of payments restric-
ted’, stress the impact of demand on growth.
As will be argued in the next section, which briefly surveys the literature
on growth in open economies, an important issue in this literature is whether
or not the specialization pattern of a country has an impact on growth. Thus,
the question is whether countries that are specialized in a particular activity
have a higher growth potential than other countries. The literature identifies
two sources for such a relationship: demand-side sources (e.g. income and
price elasticities of demand) and supply-side factors (e.g. technological oppor-
tunities).
The aim of this paper is to test the hypothesis that specialization matters
for growth at the sectoral level, and confront it with the two other perspec-
tives on growth indicated above (purely resource-based growth and purely
technology-based growth). To this end, a new data set will be presented and
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modelled. This model will be developed and estimated in Section 3 of the
paper. Section 4 summarizes the argument and draws some conclusions on
the policy implications of the findings.
2. Trade, Specialization and Growth
Growth models in the ‘Solow tradition’, as well as the so-called ‘new growth’
models, take a production function as the main determinant of economic
growth. Because of the (implicit) assumption of full utilization of factors such
as labour and capital, and given the functional form of the production
function, growth of production is simply the result of the growth rate of
inputs (labour and capital) and their productivity increases.
As summarized in Dowrick (1997), the impact of trade in the traditional
models is thus mainly an indirect one, related to the issues of allocation and
factor prices. The idea here is that an economy that is opened up to inter-
national trade can benefit from a more efficient allocation of its production
factors (along the lines of the HOS theory), and the resulting lower consumer
prices. Thus, welfare is higher in an open economy as compared to a situation
where domestic markets are protected by tariffs or quota. However, typically,
so-called CGE models indicate that these welfare effects are relatively small
(Dowrick, 1997).1
Within the more recent so-called new growth theory, Dowrick (1997)
distinguishes between two approaches: the Smithian approach and the
Ricardian approach. The Smithian approach, with authors such as Rivera-
Batiz and Romer (1991) and Rivera-Batiz and Xie (1993), stresses the
importance of ‘learning-by-doing’ or increasing returns to scale. Opening up
to trade enables individual countries to specialize in a narrow range of goods,
and thus exploit these increasing returns. The difference relative to the
traditional CGE-type models discussed above is that, due to the endogenous
growth nature of the models in the Smithian tradition, there will be a
long-run effect on growth, rather than just a level effect in terms of welfare.
In the Ricardian type models, different activities are characterized by dif-
ferent rates of growth of productivity, e.g. due to differences in technological
opportunities. Thus, countries specializing in activities with higher rates of
productivity growth are in a better position to achieve fast overall growth.
Grossman and Helpman (1991) is an example of such a model. Note,
however, that, as in the Grossman and Helpman model, it is not obvious that
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1 The welfare gains are generally larger in situations where increasing returns to scale characterize the
production process, possibly in combination with product differentiation.a higher rate of productivity growth also implies a higher growth rate of real
consumption. However, especially in situations where knowledge does not
spill over national borders, there is opportunity for national governments
to change the specialization pattern of its economy, and hence the growth
path.
As acknowledged by Dowrick (1997), the idea of a relation between trade
and growth is not new. The dynamic analysis of Keynesian models, long
before new growth theory, established the idea that trade matters for growth.
As in the recent neoclassical models discussed above, the argument comes in
two flavours here (e.g. McCombie and Thirlwall, 1995). First, there is the
export-led growth theory, which, following Kaldor (1966, 1970), argues that
the economy is not constrained by supply-side factors, because the main
production factor, capital, must be seen as an endogenous factor. Should
capital constrain economic growth in the short run, so it is argued, increased
profits will solve this constraint in the medium to long run. Thus, only natural
resources (which are indeed exogenous) are accepted as a possible supply-side
factor constraining economic growth (McCombie and Thirlwall, 1995, p.
392).2 Seen in this way, the only truly exogenous factor to the domestic
economy is foreign demand (domestic demand is endogenous to the extent
that it is determined by savings behaviour and wages).
The second variety of the post-Keynesian theory on trade and growth is
mainly due to Thirlwall. Thirlwall (1979), although operating in the same
post-Keynesian theoretical framework as Kaldor, argued that the ‘simple’
export-led growth theory does not take into account the role of the balance
of payments. For example, in the model by Dixon and Thirlwall (1975),
export growth, and thus output growth, is not constrained at all, even if the
balance of payments, which is not explicitly modelled, grows without bounds.
Viewed from the balance of payments point of view, demand elements
(domestic demand for imports as a fraction of domestic GDP , and domestic
exports as a function of foreign GDP) are again the main determinants of
growth.
McCombie and Thirlwall (1995, p. 392) set out a model of balance of
payments restricted growth, which implies that a non-zero growth rate
differential between the domestic economy and the rest of the world may arise
as a result of long-run differences in the rate of inflation, as well as differences
in the income elasticities of demand for the countries’ exports. The propo-
sition made by Thirlwall (1979) is that the long-run effect of differences in
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2 Kaldor (1966) also forcefully argued that labour must be seen as an endogenous factor, due to labour
reserves contained in the primary sector of the economy, which, by the nature of industrialization, is
contracting, and therefore ‘hides’ labour available for industry.inflation is small, so that differences in the income elasticities of demand are
the main reason for growth rate differentials.
As was argued by Fagerberg (1988), the main problem with Thirlwall’s
theory is that it does not provide an endogenous explanation of the differences
between the two income elasticities. Fagerberg argued that one might explain
these differences by drawing on ‘evolutionary’ inspired theories of growth,
which stresses the impact of factors such as product quality and R&D efforts.3
In the ‘evolutionary’ literature on economic growth, (stochastic) technological
change plays an important role. For example, in evolutionary models by
Verspagen (1993) or Dosi et al. (1994) technological competitiveness of a
country determines the growth of its export market shares. Differential rates
of growth of the total market size in different sectors, under the influence of
income elasticities, as in Pasinetti (1981), imply that different sectors grow at
different rates, such that specialization matters for growth.
Boggio (1996) rightfully argues that the evolutionary models, in many
important respects, resemble the early and later post-Keynesian models that
were discussed above. He argues, however, against a strict interpretation of the
concept of balance of payments constrained growth, and shows that in models
of national growth partly based on ‘evolutionary notions’, trade balance
disequilibrium may indeed be related to rapid growth in a Kaldor–Verdoorn
framework.Oneimportantdifferencebetweenthe‘evolutionary’growthmodel
by Verspagen (1993) and the work in the post-Keynesian tradition outlined in
this section, however, is that the latter does not attach much importance to the
issue of specialization. In the export-led growth theory, specialization does not
play a large role, as is illustrated, for example, by Dixon and Thirlwall (1975),
who present a one-sector model, which by definition excludes specialization
from the analysis. In the literature on balance of payments constrained growth,
specialization patterns may be seen as entering the growth equation indirectly,
through the elasticities of imports and exports. But this is at best only one of
the many interpretations that can be given to the differences in elasticities, and
a more elaborate empirical analysis, as done by Fagerberg (1988) with respect
to product quality and technological factors, is necessary to establish the
empirical importance of this argument.
How does all this relate to the question as to what is the relationship
between economic growth and specialization? The common conclusion from
the literature discussed in this section seems to be that this relationship takes
two forms. First, as is argued by both the new growth theorists (‘Smithians’)
and the Kaldorian export-led theory, specialization, by opening up possi-
Does Specialization Matter for Growth?
271
3 These factors, which at the time were typical for ‘evolutionary theories’, have now been incorporated
also into new growth models.bilities for increased specialization, leads to higher productivity growth in the
form of learning. In this argument, the emphasis is not so much on what a
country specializes in, but rather whether it specializes, irrespective of the
nature of the specialization.
Second, some activities might provide larger growth opportunities than
others, and therefore it matters in which activities a country is specialized (the
‘Ricardian’ view). The reasons for this might be supply-side related (e.g.
differential technological opportunities between activities) or demand-side
related (e.g. differential income elasticities between activities). In the neo-
classical (or new growth) version of this argument, an additional complication
is formed by the interrelatedness of the economy in the form of general
equilibrium. An exact modelling of the result of specialization on growth thus
not only requires the modelling of learning, but also of the evolution of factor
prices and the resulting allocation.
The next section will take as its point of departure the Ricardian view that
the growth rate of an economy depends, at least partly, on what it is the
country is specialized in. This point of view will be incorporated into a
regression model which tests the ‘Ricardian hypothesis’ jointly with the
hypotheses that growth depends on resources and technology.
3. Growth and Specialization: Regression Analysis
The hypothesis we derive from the discussion in Section 2 is that there are
some ‘activities’ that are more conducive for growth than others. What we
mean by ‘activities’ will be specified below. An alternative hypothesis is that
economic growth is solely determined by resources (labour and investment, as
in the Solow model) or technological change (as in new growth models of
endogenous R&D).
In order to test these hypotheses, we set up a model that we derive from
the general set-up that is often used in cross-country growth regressions (e.g.
Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995, ch. 12). This specifies the growth rate of
output as follows:
Here, q is the growth rate of output, y0 is initial productivity, b is a parameter
vector and x is a set of (exogenous) variables determining the steady-state (or
long-run) growth rate.4 bx is thus the expression for the long-run growth rate,
qf yx = 0,b bg
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4 Note that it is more common to use GDP per capita in the LHS of the equation. However, we will
include the growth rate of inputs, including labour, in x, so that our specification encompasses the common
one.while y0 measures the initial deviation from the long-run path. In other words,
we assume that growth is influenced on the one hand by a set of variables with
a long-run impact, and on the other hand by ‘transitory dynamics’. Note that
these transitory dynamics can be interpreted in many different ways. For
example, it may indicate ‘catching-up’ based growth (see Fagerberg, 1994), as
well as convergence in a Solow-based model.
The variables associated with our hypotheses are assumed to be included in
the vector x, and (apart from the specialization variable) can be said to be
standard variables in cross-country growth regression models (Levine and
Renelt, 1992; Fagerberg, 1994).5 The model is then made operational in the
following way:
(1)
In this equation, Q is value added (in fixed prices), L is labour input, K is
capital input, T is a proxy for technology investment, U is a variable related
to international technology diffusion, S is a vector of specialization variables to
be defined more precisely below, a, b, g, d and s are parameters, and the sub-
scripts i, j and t indicate a country, sector and time period respectively. Hats
indicate proportionate growth rates. L and K capture the effect of purely
resource-driven growth. T captures the effect of active technology investment
as it is found in new growth theory (e.g. Romer, 1990). U is a variable related
to technological catch-up or convergence, i.e. it captures the effect of a
country’s growth path deviating from its long-run path (steady state). Our
preferred interpretation of this variable is that countries with an initially
backward position may be expected to grow relatively fast due to
international diffusion of technology (see, for example, Fagerberg, 1994, for
an overview of theories on catch-up), but, as argued above, it may also be
interpreted as ‘Solowian’ convergence.
S is the variable of main interest for our chief hypothesis. In order to explain
this variable, we need to specify what we mean by ‘activities’. The national
accounts framework usually divides economic activities into sectors. At the
usual level of aggregation (say 20 sectors within manufacturing), these sectors
are still made up of rather heterogenous activities. For example, in a sector
‘transport equipment’, one would find both the manufacturing of bicycles and
aeroplanes, while in ‘office machines’, one would find photocopiers and
computers. In order to capture this heterogeneity, we use a database on export
$$$ QL K T U s S ijt jt ijt jt jt ijt jt ijt jt ijt =+ + ++ ab gd
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5 It should be pointed out that the specification of the model is not strictly consistent with the post-
Keynesian theories, discussed in Section 2, as factors of production are seen as being endogenous within
this approach.values for 75 products, each of which can be assigned to one of 11 manu-
facturing sectors. These trade data are taken from the IKE trade database
(main source: OECD).
We interpret the 75 product classes as homogenous ‘activities’. Thus, when
we speak about a country being specialized in a certain activity, we mean that
it scores a high value on the specialization index (to be defined below) for that
particular product class. Because of the assignment of the 75 product classes
to the 11 industrial sectors, we are able to say something on specialization
within those sectors.
In setting up the 75 product groups, our aim was to establish relatively
homogenous groups. Thus, in some cases (where the sector itself is already
relatively homogenous) we get a relatively small number of products (e.g.
wood and wooden products). In case of a more heterogenous sector we define
a larger number of products, like in the case of ‘transport equipment’, where
we have 11 products within one sector. The breakdown of the 11 sectors into
activities (product classes) is documented in the appendix tables.
The variable S is measured using the trade data for the 75 product classes.
The first step in this measurement procedure is to define a sectoral
specialization index, for which we use the well-known revealed comparative
advantage (RCA) index. In raw form, this index is written as
(2)
where X is the value of exports, the superscript j indicates within-sector j
RCA, and the subscript p is a product group belonging to sector j (i, as before,
indicates a country). Thus, the RCA index for product p in country i and
sector j is defined as i’s share in total exports of p divided by i’s share in total
exports of sector j. Because the RCA index is not symmetric (values for
negative specialization are squeezed into the interval [0,1ñ, while values for
positive specialization are in á1,¥]), we apply the transformation RCA* =
(RCA – 1)/(RCA + 1). This yields values in [–1,0ñ for negative special-
ization, and values in á0,1] for positive specialization. Neutral specialization
corresponds to a zero value. In summary, a positive (negative) value for
product p indicates that the corresponding sector j in the country is specialized
(despecialized) in that particular product.6
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6 Note that within each sector, a country is always specialized in some products. Thus, even if a country
is despecialized in the sector taken as a whole, it will be specialized in some of the product classes.specialization indices, in which case S would have as many elements as there
are product classes in a sector. This procedure has the major disadvantage,
however, that in many cases there are many product classes as compared
to the number of countries in our data set. In other words, using such a
procedure, the number of degrees of freedom would become quite low.
We therefore implement a second step in our procedure of measuring S by
applying principal components analysis to the data for RCAj* for four key
years: 1965, 1973, 1979 and 1988. These years all (roughly) correspond to
peaks in the business and trade cycles, so that our data are not over-influenced
by cyclical variations in export market shares or exchange rates. Principal
components analysis, a form of factor analysis, is a technique aimed at data
reduction; it estimates linear combinations of the underlying variables, in this
case the specialization indices, which ‘explain’ the highest possible fraction of
the remaining variance in the data set. Thus, the first principal component is
estimated to explain the highest possible fraction of the total variance, the
second principal component the highest possible fraction of the variance not
explained by the first principal component, etc. By maximizing the ‘explained
residual variance’ in each round, the first m principal components will explain
a relatively large proportion of the total variance, which is why the technique
is used for data reduction.
The result of this procedure is a number of variables (usually two or three)
for each sector, which give a ‘synthetic’ impression of differences in special-
ization patterns per country. The value of each variable itself does not have a
direct interpretation, because they are a linear combination of the underlying
RCA values. The coefficients of this linear combination (the so-called factor
loadings) are documented in the appendix tables. The next section will make
use of the signs of these factor loadings in combination with the estimated
regression coefficients. In this section, it is only the question whether or not
the estimated regression coefficients are significant which interests us, not the
numerical value or sign of the estimated coefficients.
The regression analysis makes use of data for the period 1965–1988, and
20 OECD countries [Austria, Belgium, Canada, The Netherlands, Portugal,
Spain, France, Germany (West), Switzerland, Denmark, Sweden, Norway,
Finland, Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States, Greece, Turkey,
Ireland, Italy]. We estimate separate equations for three periods: 1965–1973,
1973–1979 and 1979–1988. The breakpoints between these periods corres-
pond to the peaks of the international business cycle. All our variables, except
those related to specialization and catch-up, are simple means over the
complete period, with growth rates defined as annual compound rates.
Besides the specialization variables, equation (1) includes four other variables:
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the investment-output ratio (I, as a proxy for the growth rate of capital), the
number of patents granted in the United States per employee (P)a sa n
indicator of investment in technical change, and the ratio of value added per
employee in the country/sector relative to the maximum value for the sector
in the 20 countries sample (CU). The latter variable is measured for the initial
year of the period for which growth rates are measured. Given the inter-
pretation of this variable as a catch-up variable, we would expect a negative
sign for it in the regressions. The signs for the other non-specialization
variables are all expected to be positive.
The patent data we use are taken from the US patent office, and concern
patent grants, dated by the year of grant. The attribution of patents to
countries and industrial sectors is done by the patent office. Whenever a
patent is attributed to more than one, say m, sector, the patent is counted as
1/m in each of these. We choose to work with US patents because, rather than
patent statistics from each of the national patent offices, these are subject to
a common institutional system (novelty requirements, etc.), and, moreover,
the United States, for most of the period under consideration, constituted the
largest ‘technology market’ in the world. Because we would expect US firms
to have relatively much patents due to a ‘home-market’ effect, we include a
dummy for the United States in the regressions (DUSA). The data for the
growth rates of value added, CU, GL, I and the employees data used in P is
taken from the UNIDO Industrial Statistics Database.
As equation (1) specifies, we expect the value of parameters to be estimated
to differ between sectors. Given the limited number of observations within
each sector, however, we  choose to pool our  data  in  the cross-section
dimension, allowing for two broad classes of sectors: so-called high-tech sectors
(defined as chemicals, machines, electrical goods, transport equipment and
instruments) and low-tech sectors (all other sectors). This broad classification
has proven to be useful in estimating production structures and the impact of
R&D on productivity in an earlier paper (Verspagen, 1995).
The resulting data set is one in which we have 11 sectors (no patent data
are available for two other sectors, i.e. wood and other manufacturing), and
20 countries, leading, in principle, to 220 data points for each period. Due to
missing values in some of the data, however, we have a smaller number of
observations in each case. For the first period, this problem is worst, with only
98 data points available. We estimate the impact of the variables I, GL, CU
and P separately for the two groups of sectors, and denote this by the variable
symbol together with ‘-high’ or ‘-low’.
The specialization indices are defined meaningfully only at the sectoral
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to three of the principal components in the final estimates presented below,
although we experimented with more in some sectors. The resulting setup is
one in which the principal components included in the regression pick up at
least 60% of the total variance of the specialization data (see appendix Table
A2). Including the fourth, sometimes fifth, principal component did not
change the results in a major way. We denote the principal components by
Fi–sA, where A is the number of the sector, and i is the ith principal
component.
We would expect that the impact of specialization on the growth perfor-
mance of large countries may be smaller than in the case of small countries.
The reason for this expectation is that smaller countries might be more
dependent on their external relations, and because small countries are in
general more specialized than large countries (Balassa, 1965; Dosi et al.,
1990). Hence, an additional variable is included for all of the three principal
components included in the regressions, defined as Fi–sA*DL,w h e r eDL is a
dummy variable set to 1 for large countries.7 Note that this variable, because
it is entered in the equation in an additive manner, is only meaningful if the
sectoral specialization variables all enter the regression equation with the same
sign. However, because of the way the specialization variables are constructed,
we do not have a priori expectations on this sign. In order to ensure the
meaningfulness of the large countries specialization variable, we started with
an initial regression including all specialization variables with their original
sign. In the next step, we multiplied all specialization variables with a
negative sign in the regression by –1, thus expecting that they would turn up
with a positive sign.8 This yields a regression in which we would expect the
large country specialization variable to turn up with a negative sign. However,
in order to allow for a direct comparison between Table 1 and appendix Table
A1 (see the next section), Table 1 presents those factors that were multiplied
by –1 with a negative sign.
Table 1 documents the regression outcomes for the three periods. We
discuss the outcomes for the non-specialization variables first. The growth
rate of labour input is highly significant and positive in all cases. The values
of the coefficients for this variable differ between periods and sectors, with the
highest value found in low-tech sectors during the period 1965–1973 (this
value is indeed quite high if one would reason in a neoclassical framework).
In the period 1973–1979, the value for these coefficients are relatively low.
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7 France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States and Italy are defined as large
countries.
8 In no cases did this procedure change our conclusions about the significance levels of any of the
variables in the regressions.TABLE 1. Regression Results for the Specialization–Growth Relationship
1965–1973 1973–1979 1979–1988
R2-adj 0.67 0.47 0.22
N 98 158 164
Variable Estimate t-value Estimate t-value estimate t-value
GL-low 1.269 6.73 0.587 7.14 0.764 5.85
GL-high 0.532 5.95 0.583 3.29 0.817 3.51
I-low 0.215 2.73 –0.012 –0.32 0.072 1.63
I-high 0.388 6.29 0.248 3.52 0.223 2.92
DUSA –0.025 –1.83 0.022 2.58 0.018 1.91
Pat-low –5.179 –0.83 –4.704 –1.10 –13.157 –1.84
Pat-high 6.482 3.83 2.446 1.80 4.643 1.23
CU-low –1.990 –5.00 –0.632 –3.40 –0.092 –0.41
CU-high –2.780 –8.18 –1.596 –4.47 –0.566 –1.53
F1–s1 –0.011 1.89 –0.002 0.30 0.006 0.68
F1–s2 0.004 0.53 0.001 0.22 0.004 0.96
F1–s4 0.029 1.91 –0.023 2.16 –0.007 1.07
F1–s5 –0.008 1.19 0.000 0.09 –0.007 1.58
F1–s6 0.008 2.74 0.000 0.19 –0.003 0.90
F1–s7 –0.006 0.67 0.007 1.17 –0.004 0.53
F1–s8 –0.017 2.51 0.008 3.25 –0.001 0.08
F1–s9 –0.007 1.05 0.024 3.53 –0.009 0.95
F1–s10 –0.007 0.79 –0.006 1.46 –0.013 1.62
F1–s11 –0.014 3.16 –0.001 0.08 –0.005 0.61
F1–s12 0.011 1.74 0.013 1.55 0.012 1.12
F1-large –0.007 –1.28 –0.016 –3.41 –0.009 –1.21
F2–s1 –0.015 1.98 –0.001 0.16 0.013 1.81
F2–s2 –0.003 0.57 –0.005 1.31 –0.002 0.45
F2–s4 –0.022 4.68 –0.027 4.40 –0.008 1.21
F2–s5 –0.002 0.14 –0.010 1.60 –0.010 1.85
F2–s6 –0.010 3.17 –0.010 2.63 –0.013 2.63
F2–s7 –0.005 0.53 –0.008 1.38 –0.006 1.14
F2–s8 –0.001 0.21 –0.002 0.49 –0.010 2.02
F2–s9 0.016 1.54 –0.007 0.58 –0.017 1.34
F2–s10 –0.001 0.18 0.003 0.44 –0.006 0.74
F2–s11 0.010 2.60 –0.014 1.28 0.012 1.62
F2–s12 0.026 5.03 –0.023 1.83 –0.024 2.52
F2–large –0.003 –0.46 0.002 0.34 0.009 1.22
F3–s1 –0.006 1.10 0.002 0.31 0.012 2.34
F3–s4 –0.022 3.51 0.028 3.88 0.002 0.69
F3–s7 0.005 0.78 –0.001 0.07 –0.005 0.71
F3–s8 0.011 1.31 0.009 1.60 –0.002 0.22
F3–s9 –0.001 0.27 –0.028 2.67 0.005 0.74
F3–s10 –0.018 1.84 –0.006 1.02 0.000 0.04
F3–s11 –0.015 4.23 0.022 2.37 –0.006 0.56
F3-large 0.005 1.02 0.004 0.76 –0.004 –0.93
C 0.066 7.47 0.030 4.44 0.025 2.37
Cells with coefficients significant at a level >10% in a two-tailed t-test are printed in bold.
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one case. The one exception is low-tech industries during the period 1973–
1979. For all three periods, the value of this coefficient is higher for the
high-tech sectors, while the value of the coefficients tends to fall over time.
The patents variable is significant and positive, as expected, in only two cases:
high tech industries during 1965–1973 and 1973–1979. For low-tech indus-
tries, this variable is always negative, during the last period even significantly
so, a result that is hard to explain. The variable reflecting catch-up has the
right (negative) sign in all three periods. However, it is becoming of less im-
portance over time—to the extent that it becomes insignificant in the period
1979–1988. This result is at odds with the stylized fact that convergence in
terms of income per capita has more or less come to an end after 1973
(Abramowitz, 1986). The US dummy is negative during the first period, in
line with our expectations about the ‘home market’ effect for US firms in the
patents variable, but it is perfectly conceivable that this variable also picks up
other influences specific to the United States.9 For the other two periods, the
US dummy is positive and significant.
Overall, the regressions tend to explain a decreasing fraction of the total
variance as time increases. The adjusted R2 falls from roughly two-thirds in
the first period to slightly less than one-half in the second, to barely one-fifth
of the total variance in the last period.
With regard to the specialization variables, which are the crucial part of our
argument, we do indeed find many significant variables. Only in textiles (2)
and basic metals (7) are none of the specialization variables significant. For
the other nine sectors, there is at least one, but often more, principal com-
ponent for one time period that is significant. In the first period, roughly half
of all of the specialization variables are significant (14 out of 29), for the
second period this is slightly less (11 out of 29), and for the last period it is
even less (8 out of 29). We thus conclude that there is indeed some evidence
that sectoral growth rates of production are related to within-sector special-
ization patterns of international trade, although the impact seems to become
weaker over time.
We can only speculate as to why the specialization variables are becoming
less important over time as a factor explaining growth. It might be related to
the fact that our sample is not a balanced one (some observations in the
sample for the last period are not present in the early period), thus reducing
the phenomenon at least partly to an artificial one. It might also be the case
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9 We have also experimented with dummy variables for other countries, but in no cases did these prove
to influence the results in the table in an important way, even if some of the country dummies were
statistically significant for some periods.that a ‘real’ phenomena, such as trade liberalization, the increased importance
of FDI, or technological developments underlying the production structure
have a role in this. For the time being, we will not discuss this part of our
findings from  a  statistical point of view, but instead focus on a  more
‘qualitative’ interpretation of our regression results in the next section.
4. Interpretations, Conclusions and Policy Issues
The regression results presented in the previous section seem to indicate that
specialization does indeed matter for economic growth. Compared to a model
in which a combination of resource-based and technology-based explanations
of growth are offered, the specialization factor adds explanatory power. The
theoretical frameworks that were discussed in Section 2 suggest that there are
various factors that may account for these results. On the supply-side, there
are factors such as the learning opportunities offered by various activities or
products, while from the demand-side, income elasticities are important.
The result that the variables such as technology (as measured by patents),
specialization and catching-up potential all show a weaker impact on growth
during the 1980s suggests that there might be an interaction between them.
For example, one hypothesis would be that catching-up in the 1960s and
1970s was mainly due to a non-activity-specific rapid learning of relatively
backward economies, while in the 1980s, catching-up became an activity-
specific phenomena. Some activities provide ‘windows of opportunity’ for
catch-up, while others, e.g. due to their relatively cumulative technological
nature, provide more opportunities for relatively advanced countries. This
would imply that neither the general catch-up variable, nor the general
specialization variable would turn up significantly in the regressions. It has to
be stressed, however, that such an interpretation is rather speculative, and
more research would be necessary to substantiate these ideas. We can only
present some ‘impressionistic’ evidence based on our regressions to explore the
implications of the speculations.
In order to obtain a more precise notion of which activities have had a
‘positive’ impact on growth, the methodology can be taken one step further.
If the factor loadings from appendix Table A1 (numerically above 0.5,
admittedly an arbitrary value) are combined with the regression results in
Table 1, it is possible to analyse the impact of intra-sectoral specialization
patterns on sectoral growth, i.e. to obtain a positive or negative impact on
growth. The results of this exercise are documented in Table 2. It should,
however, be kept in mind that the data reduction, itself a central aim of the
principal components methodology, by definition leaves out some of the
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level should be interpreted with caution. It should also be stressed that the
specialization patterns referred to are calculated at the intra-sectoral level—
the weighted average of the specialization indicator sums to zero for each of
the sectors.
Applying this procedure yields a number of products which have a
‘significant’ impact on sectoral growth in each of the three periods. Such a
procedure shows that the interpretation of our regression results is indeed one
that involves a rather complex set of interacting supply- and demand-side
factors. From the theoretical discussion in Section 2, it could be concluded
that specialization in activities offering high levels of technological oppor-
tunity and/or in areas with high income elasticities are expected to have a
positive impact on growth. From Table 2 it can be seen that in some cases
(again it should be kept in mind that the principal components methodology
leaves out information) this ‘prediction’ holds. The high demand for ships in
the 1960s; high learning opportunities in drugs in the 1970s; low demand
for cars in the 1970s; and the high learning opportunities/high demand for
telecommunications equipment in the 1980s are all examples of cases where
high technological opportunities and/or high income elasticity seem to be
intuitively plausible characteristics.
However, there are also a number of cases in which the intuition is less clear.
From Table 2, it can be seen, for example, that within the electrical goods
sector, specialization in semiconductors in 1979 turns out to have had a
negative impact on real growth in value added (of the electrical goods sector)
1979–1988, in spite of high growth of the value of international trade in
semiconductors over that period.10 Inspection of underlying data shows that
only a few countries are specialized in semiconductors, including ‘established’
technology leaders such as Japan, the Unites States and The Netherlands
(Philips), as well as less advanced countries such as Austria (where Philips has
many of its production facilities) and Portugal (which has a relatively low
export volume in electrical goods). Although these countries (perhaps with
the exception of Portugal) have seen the volume of their semiconductor
exports increase significantly over the period, they have also experienced
increasing competition by catching-up nations, which have been growing
rapidly, but only in selected product-segments, like telecommunications
equipment.
This result seems to suggest that what we know from theory concerning
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10 The fact that plastics had a negative impact on growth within chemicals, as well as the negative
impact of cars within transport in the 1960s, are other results that do not square with what was expected
from a theoretical point of view.TABLE 2. The Impact of Intra-sectoral Specialization Patterns on Growth, 1965–1988
Sector Positive impact on growth Negative impact on growth
1965–1973
food, beverages, tobacco fish, alcoholic beverages meat, cereals, non-alcoholic
beverages, tobacco, other, animal
food, oils
textiles, clothes, leather
chemicals inorganic, other dyeing, drugs, plastic, organic
rubber and plastic products
glass, clay, etc. building materials sanitary, glass, pottery, other
basic metals
simple metal products scrap metal hand tools, stoves, furniture
machines
electrical goods other white goods, medical
transport equipment ships auto engines, locomotives, other
railway, cars, trucks, auto parts,
non-motor




chemicals organic, dyeing, drugs, oils inorganic, fertilizers, plastic, other
rubber and plastic products other
glass, clay, etc. glass pottery
basic metals
simple metal products stoves, furniture wires, screws, scrap
machines specialized, other computers, office machines, metal
working, textiles, firearms
electrical goods
transport equipment non-motor cars
instruments photo optical
1979–1988
food, beverages, tobacco alcoholic beverages cereals, vegetables, non-alcoholic
beverages, fish, animal food, oils
textiles, clothes, leather
chemicals
rubber and plastic products other
glass, clay, etc. sanitary pottery
basic metals
simple metal products hand tools scrap
machines
electrical goods telecom, white goods tv etc., semiconductors




Product groups with positive (negative) impact are those for which the principal component is significant
in Table A1, and the product group has a factor loading >0.5 (<–0.5). Factor loadings for principal
components which enter the equations in Table A1 with a negative sign have been multiplied by –1.
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levels of technological opportunities and/or high income elasticities is not
enough per se. We need to take into account appropriability conditions as well.
Specifically, our interpretation of the negative impact of semiconductor
specialization on growth in electrical goods production is based on the
above-mentioned hypothesis that in the 1980s catching-up is highly activity
specific. In the semiconductor segment of the electrical goods industry, the
‘technology leaders’ are in the best position, due to, for example, the short
product lifecycle and high investments in this sector. The appropriability
conditions in semiconductors seem to foster considerable barriers to entry.
Other segments of the electrical goods industry, however, seem to provide a
‘window of opportunity’ for catching-up for relatively backward nations,
which implies that catching-up related rapid growth in the industry as a
whole is correlated with negative specialization in semiconductors.11 Or, in
other words, the capability to use (imported) semiconductors in a wide array
of products may be of far more importance for economic growth than the
capability to produce and export the semiconductors.
This example (others could be mentioned) indeed brings out the
complicated nature of the causal relationship between specialization and
growth. Demand-related mechanisms (e.g. the high income elasticities of
semiconductors) may not always work in the same direction as supply-side
effects (e.g. the limited opportunity for catching-up in semiconductors), and
the net result is rather unpredictable from the theories that we have discussed
in Section 2. Hence, this part of our conclusions calls for better theories,
taking into account this kind of interaction.
Perhaps more interesting is the mixed pattern that emerges when we
compare the impact of one product group across periods. In 29 cases, a single
product group appears with a similar impact (negative or positive) for
different periods. However, in 35 cases, the same product group appears with
different impacts for different periods.12 This seems to indicate that the
stickiness with regard to the sign of the impact of specialization on growth is
not very large.
Where does this leave policy-makers who want to ‘steer’ the economy into
a high-growth specialization path? First, it has to be noted that the oppor-
tunities for such policies are probably low. Dalum et al. (1998) find that,
within the group of OECD countries, specialization patterns tend to be sticky
over the 1965–1992 period, although their conclusion is not for intra-sectoral
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11 One might thus call the negative correlation a ‘statistical artefact’.
12 These numbers are ‘double-counted’, i.e. if a product group appears twice with the same impact, we
counted it twice.specialization as in the present analysis. On the other hand, in terms of the
5–10 year periods that we have considered in the analysis, changes with
regard to the sign of the impact of specialization on growth are quite
common. Thus, the relative stability of the factor loadings in appendix Table
A1 and other efforts to measure long-term change of export specialization
patterns imply some degree of tension: the ‘reaction speed’ of specialization
patterns might simply be too low to allow for an active policy. Moreover, our
finding that both supply- and demand-side factors matter calls for a cautious
mix of different policies: e.g. technology policies aimed at increasing the rate
of innovation and learning; industrial policies aimed at changing the
specialization patterns of the economy; and, within international rules, trade
policies aimed at stimulating exports. It is obvious that if policies aimed at
stimulating growth by specializing in the ‘right’ kind activities are to be
successful, policy-makers must be prepared to aim at a high degree of
interaction between their various instruments, as well as be willing to risk
unsuccessful attempts, and admit these at an early enough stage. Enhancing
growth by steering specialization patterns seems a quite risky ‘art’ rather than
a well-established ‘science’ without major uncertainty.
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TABLE A1. Factor Loadings, Principal Components Analysis of Within-sector Specialization
Patterns of Export Values, 1965–1979a
Principal component 1 Principal component 2 Principal component 3
1979 1973 1965 1979 1973 1965 1979 1973 1965
1. Food, beverages and tobacco
1 Meat 0.85 0.78 0.55 0.21 0.04 0.21 0.22 0.45 0.71
2 Fish –0.54 –0.51 –0.52 0.37 0.16 –0.10 –0.50 –0.19 –0.31
3 Cereals –0.00 0.50 0.52 –0.86 –0.06 0.17 –0.23 –0.63 –0.61
4 Vegetables –0.58 –0.48 –0.17 –0.63 –0.34 –0.38 0.19 –0.42 –0.59
5 Animal-food 0.39 0.06 –0.21 0.02 0.82 0.70 –0.66 0.04 –0.12
6 Oils –0.51 –0.47 –0.42 –0.18 0.54 0.65 –0.69 –0.55 –0.55
7 Non-alco 0.51 0.67 0.80 –0.71 –0.44 –0.23 –0.04 –0.48 –0.25
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Principal component 1 Principal component 2 Principal component 3
1979 1973 1965 1979 1973 1965 1979 1973 1965
8 Alco –0.19 –0.12 0.33 –0.15 –0.78 –0.77 0.68 0.11 –0.28
9 Tobacco 0.74 0.77 0.74 0.02 0.28 0.43 –0.21 0.02 –0.21
10 Other 0.78 0.84 0.84 –0.17 0.12 0.27 –0.18 –0.33 –0.16
2. Textiles, clothes and leather
11 Raw 0.69 0.64 0.26 0.06 0.41 0.87 0.72 0.65 0.41
12 Yarn 0.92 0.91 –0.92 0.03 –0.21 0.27 –0.27 –0.24 –0.16
13 Leather –0.81 –0.65 0.92 –0.46 0.72 –0.27 0.25 –0.12 –0.14
14 Clothing –0.55 –0.69 –0.31 0.82 –0.58 –0.86 0.10 0.40 0.41
3. Wood and wooden products
15 Products 0.35 0.67 0.74 0.93 0.72 0.66 0.09 0.14 0.12
16 Raw –0.97 –0.97 –0.97 –0.02 0.03 0.06 0.22 0.26 0.25
17 Furnitureb 0.90 0.79 0.84 –0.39 –0.58 –0.51 0.21 0.19 0.18
4. Chemicals
20 Plasticb 0.32 0.13 0.35 0.02 0.90 0.83 0.82 0.14 0.10
21 Organic –0.54 –0.52 –0.05 0.48 0.30 0.44 0.54 0.41 0.86
22 Inorganic 0.80 0.91 0.80 –0.42 –0.09 –0.25 –0.19 0.04 0.23
23 Other –0.14 –0.24 –0.21 0.80 0.23 0.45 –0.36 –0.88 –0.72
24 Dyeing –0.80 –0.69 –0.54 0.25 0.20 0.61 –0.19 –0.24 0.08
25 Fertilizers 0.64 0.70 0.25 0.41 –0.29 0.22 –0.45 –0.23 0.08
26 Drugs –0.82 –0.87 –0.94 –0.32 –0.32 0.02 –0.21 0.02 0.15
27 Oils –0.57 –0.40 –0.57 –0.64 –0.61 –0.57 –0.16 –0.09 0.27
5. Rubber and plastic products
28 Other 0.19 0.09 0.69 0.98 0.99 0.73 0.02 0.04 0.03
29 Rubber –0.96 0.97 0.90 0.13 0.04 –0.31 –0.24 –0.23 0.29
30 Plastic 0.97 –0.96 –0.92 –0.07 0.14 0.24 –0.24 –0.23 0.31
6. Glass, clay, etc.
31 Pottery 0.30 0.38 0.05 0.85 0.81 0.77 0.03 0.36 0.54
32 Sanitary 0.48 0.60 –0.57 –0.71 –0.16 0.68 0.23 0.53 0.04
33 Glass 0.78 0.70 –0.93 –0.12 –0.57 –0.23 –0.57 0.06 0.03
34 Building –0.95 –0.95 –0.87 –0.08 –0.05 0.19 0.10 0.08 –0.02
35 Other 0.74 0.60 –0.06 0.14 0.24 0.53 0.57 –0.69 –0.69
7. Basic metals
36 Steel 0.90 0.88 0.91 0.23 0.16 0.09 0.01 0.15 0.29
37 Wires 0.23 0.34 0.58 0.69 –0.73 –0.02 0.16 0.14 –0.31
38 Aluminum –0.55 –0.54 –0.49 –0.66 0.68 0.67 0.37 –0.21 0.27
39 Uranium –0.08 –0.19 0.46 0.47 0.36 0.07 0.83 0.78 –0.57
40 Silver –0.73 –0.48 –0.04 0.29 –0.17 0.64 0.07 0.62 –0.53
41 Copper –0.48 –0.70 –0.49 0.74 –0.57 –0.56 –0.34 –0.06 –0.60
42 Other –0.72 –0.86 –0.03 0.17 –0.08 0.76 –0.16 –0.12 –0.22
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Principal component 1 Principal component 2 Principal component 3
1979 1973 1965 1979 1973 1965 1979 1973 1965
8. Simple metal products
43 Structural 0.07 0.31 0.31 0.38 0.49 0.61 0.48 0.05 0.57
44 Wires, screws 0.44 –0.88 0.44 –0.54 –0.06 0.74 –0.53 –0.15 –0.14
45 Hand tools 0.06 –0.45 0.64 0.76 –0.76 –0.51 –0.52 –0.14 –0.28
46 Stoves –0.85 0.92 0.66 –0.37 –0.17 –0.41 0.21 –0.08 0.31
47 Furniture –0.57 0.07 0.66 0.56 –0.42 0.44 –0.19 0.89 –0.48
48 Scrap 0.70 –0.55 –0.88 0.25 0.65 0.24 0.43 0.34 –0.20
9. Machines
49 Agriculture 0.55 0.11 0.58 0.02 0.77 0.48 0.40 0.46 0.24
50 Turbines 0.70 –0.38 0.65 0.35 0.59 0.23 0.32 0.17 –0.43
51 Computers 0.51 –0.62 0.71 0.65 0.63 0.48 –0.44 –0.17 –0.15
52 Office –0.04 –0.69 0.69 0.76 0.19 –0.28 0.04 –0.38 –0.12
53 Metal working –0.39 –0.72 0.79 0.43 –0.05 –0.48 0.73 0.42 –0.02
54 Textile –0.62 –0.52 0.47 0.44 –0.71 –0.74 0.55 –0.04 –0.05
55 Specialized 0.52 0.69 0.12 –0.46 0.18 0.38 0.61 0.37 –0.76
56 Other –0.13 0.85 –0.82 –0.67 0.08 0.09 0.21 –0.30 –0.22
57 Firearms –0.68 –0.11 0.42 –0.04 –0.55 0.42 –0.18 0.60 0.68
10. Electrical goods, excluding computers
58 TV , etc 0.72 0.63 0.49 0.18 0.04 0.06 0.29 0.08 0.80
59 Generating 0.29 0.03 0.33 –0.23 0.71 –0.45 –0.87 0.50 –0.04
60 Telecom –0.59 0.18 0.24 –0.38 –0.89 0.73 0.24 0.16 –0.52
61 White goods –0.74 –0.88 0.78 0.09 0.05 –0.34 0.26 0.23 –0.23
62 Medical 0.07 0.34 0.86 –0.85 –0.21 0.17 0.31 0.85 –0.16
63 Other 0.40 0.42 –0.88 –0.70 0.30 0.19 –0.00 –0.01 0.05
64 Semicond. 0.71 0.67 0.33 0.16 0.16 0.71 0.49 –0.27 0.35
11. Transport equipment
65 Aero engines 0.53 0.69 0.55 0.56 0.39 0.73 0.38 0.36 0.12
66 Auto engines 0.44 0.50 0.71 0.51 0.04 –0.25 –0.27 0.41 0.51
67 Non-motor 0.06 –0.10 0.27 0.75 –0.38 –0.67 0.01 0.80 0.56
68 Locomotives 0.74 0.39 0.54 –0.37 –0.66 –0.24 –0.05 –0.18 –0.21
69 Other railway 0.61 0.36 0.58 –0.27 –0.75 –0.74 –0.42 0.23 0.03
70 Cars 0.52 0.54 0.53 –0.45 0.03 –0.02 0.28 –0.64 –0.47
71 Trucks –0.28 0.22 0.76 –0.58 –0.12 –0.19 –0.34 –0.03 –0.36
72 Auto parts 0.83 0.87 0.84 0.01 0.04 0.31 0.06 –0.31 –0.10
73 Motorcycles 0.03 –0.03 0.32 0.11 –0.82 –0.79 –0.89 –0.20 –0.25
74 Aircraft 0.77 0.78 0.69 0.27 0.21 0.53 –0.22 0.29 0.23
75 Ships –0.50 –0.87 –0.86 0.56 0.03 –0.35 –0.23 0.02 –0.05
12. Instruments
76 Measuring 0.89 0.86 0.77 0.27 0.25 0.43 0.11 0.06 0.27
77 Medical 0.04 0.66 –0.73 –0.84 –0.45 0.28 –0.33 –0.16 –0.11
78 Optical –0.62 –0.23 0.39 0.51 –0.53 –0.17 0.28 0.81 –0.89
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Principal component 1 Principal component 2 Principal component 3
1979 1973 1965 1979 1973 1965 1979 1973 1965
79 Photo –0.57 –0.11 0.79 –0.46 0.82 –0.11 0.57 0.39 0.08
80 Clocks –0.59 –0.89 –0.02 0.27 –0.06 –0.93 –0.69 –0.32 0.24
13. Other manufacturing
81 Pearls 0.87 0.93 0.92 0.34 0.24 0.28 0.05 0.03 0.16
82 Music –0.31 –0.29 –0.53 0.87 0.95 0.71 –0.37 –0.12 –0.46
83 Toys, sports –0.74 –0.84 –0.63 0.48 –0.14 0.40 0.46 –0.48 0.66
84 Other –0.84 –0.79 –0.87 –0.39 0.07 –0.43 –0.22 0.59 –0.03
aFactor loadings with absolute values > 0.5 are in bold.
bWe have two more products groups for the sector ‘printing and publishing’, however, for two product
groups it does not make sense to calculate principal components, so the numbering in the table is
non-consecutive.
TABLE A2. Cumulative R2 Values for Subsequent Principal Components
Sector 1979 1973 1965
F1 F2 F3 F1 F2 F3 F1 F2 F3
1 Food etc. 0.32 0.51 0.70 0.33 0.53 0.68 0.31 0.52 0.70
2 Textiles, etc. 0.57 0.79 0.96 0.53 0.80 0.96 0.46 0.87 0.96
3 Wood, etc. 0.63 0.97 1.00 0.67 0.96 1.00 0.73 0.96 1.00
4 Chemicals 0.39 0.61 0.79 0.38 0.58 0.71 0.30 0.53 0.71
5 Rubber and plastic 0.63 0.96 1.00 0.63 0.96 1.00 0.71 0.94 1.00
6 Glass, etc. 0.48 0.73 0.87 0.45 0.67 0.85 0.39 0.67 0.87
7 Basic metal 0.35 0.61 0.75 0.38 0.60 0.75 0.27 0.52 0.70
8 Simple metal 0.29 0.55 0.72 0.37 0.61 0.77 0.39 0.65 0.79
9 Machines 0.26 0.50 0.69 0.34 0.58 0.71 0.38 0.57 0.72
10 Electrical 0.31 0.52 0.71 0.28 0.48 0.65 0.38 0.58 0.74
11 Transport 0.30 0.51 0.64 0.32 0.50 0.65 0.40 0.65 0.75
12 Instruments 0.37 0.63 0.83 0.41 0.65 0.84 0.38 0.62 0.81
13 Other 0.53 0.84 0.94 0.57 0.82 0.96 0.57 0.81 0.97
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